Abstract-Web search histories can reveal detailed and sensitive information about people. Private information retrieval (PIR) tackles this potential privacy violation by allowing users to retrieve the th record of a database without revealing to the server. However, most known PIR schemes are either very inefficient (and therefore unlikely to gain traction in a practical sense) or reliant on some restrictive assumptions. In this paper, we consider an efficient class of schemes called multi-server PIR. Multi-server PIR assumes that the client communicates with multiple, non-colluding servers, each possessing an identical copy of the database. Significant prior work has gone towards relaxing the anti-collusion assumption, but the literature does not address the assumption that servers store perfectly-synchronized databases. This seems implausible, especially if servers are not meant to collude. We propose the first multi-server PIR scheme to return the desired record even when servers' databases are not perfectly synchronized. Our scheme asymptotically has the same computational and communication complexity as state-of-the-art PIR schemes for synchronized databases; this comes at the expense of probabilistic success and two rounds of communication (most existing schemes require only one). Additionally, this approach efficiently processes multiple concurrent PIR queries.
Much research has been proposed to help people maintain privacy while searching databases. The most common class of solutions aims to hide the identity of the client, often through techniques like onion-routing; Tor is the most well-known network in this class [11] . However, these systems work under the assumption that masking a client's identity gives a sufficient level of privacy. This may not be true in general, since the content of certain queries is strongly associated with the identity of the person making the query. A classic example is users searching for their own names or workplaces.
To address this concern, some private search tools instead mask the contents of web queries. These tools include chaffing and winnowing approaches like TrackMeNot [17] , encrypted database searches [28] , private information retrieval (PIR) [7] , oblivious transfer [30] , and private stream searches (PSS) [5] , [25] . Chaffing and winnowing involves sending bogus queries to a server and extracting only the relevant results. Unfortunately, given a basic search history, the server can often predict which query was desired [27] . PIR allows a client to retrieve a particular record from an indexed list without revealing the desired index to the server [7] ; for this to be effective, the client must know the ordering of content in a database. -out-ofoblivious transfer is similar to PIR, though it places an additional constraint that the client must learn nothing other than the desired record [23] . PSS instead executes keyword searches without revealing the keyword to the server [25] . In this work, we aim to improve the practicality of PIR.
A. Context and Problem Statement
Broadly, there are two types of PIR: single-server and multi-server. Single server PIR assumes a client-server architecture and provides computational security guarantees, much like -out-of-oblivious transfer [23] . 1 Single-server PIR tends to be computationally heavy, and often relies on expensive operations like modular exponentiation [34] . Multi-server PIR, on the other hand, tends to be more efficient (both in computation and communication) [24] . Despite its efficiency gains, multi-server PIR has gained little traction in practice, likely due to the restrictive assumptions on which it relies. These include:
1) Multiple servers are available.
2) Each server stores a duplicate copy of the database.
3) The individual servers do not collude. 4) Servers are honest-but-curious. 2 5) Servers willingly implement PIR algorithms. Fig. 1 . A P2P PIR system would organically circumvent several of the problems that arise in multi-server PIR. Fig. 2 . Existing multi-server PIR schemes fail when databases are unsynchronized-i.e., database order and size is preserved, but some records may be nonidentical across all servers.
Existing multi-server PIR research has mainly addressed assumptions 3 and 4. Existing schemes allow up to servers to collude without losing any privacy [2] , [14] ; other PIR schemes are robust to Byzantine servers that return arbitrary, incorrect information [3] , [10] . Devet et al. observed that collusion-resistant and optimally Byzantine-resistant multi-server PIR can be computationally efficient in practice [10] , and subsequently proposed a hybrid PIR scheme that combines ideas from computational and information-theoretic PIR [9] .
Even with these promising developments, there are obstacles to widespread adoption. It seems unlikely that multiple servers would maintain identical databases without colluding. Further, there is little incentive for service providers like Google to allow private searches, barring legal intervention. We believe widespread collusion would be less likely in distributed systems, e.g. a peer-to-peer (P2P) setting. Privacy-minded individuals may sacrifice computational resources to help protect one another's privacy. We therefore envision storing small database chunks on different nodes in a P2P network and using these nodes as PIR servers (Fig. 1) . This architecture organically addresses assumptions 1, 3, 4, and 5, which suggests that multi-server PIR might be a useful tool in this setting.
However, to the best of our knowledge, neither a P2P architecture nor existing PIR research addresses assumption 2-indeed, a P2P architecture is likely to increase the likelihood of mis-synchronization between nodes, making assumption 2 even less plausible. Recent work by Gertner et al. [13] and Shah et al. [32] require servers to store coded database chunks instead of identical copies; however, the coded database chunks are still computed from a unified view of the database.
The Problem: A client wishes to submit a multi-server PIR query to servers whose databases are not perfectly synchronized. That is, at least one server stores a different version of one or more records compared to the other servers (Fig. 2) . Design a multi-server PIR scheme for this setting.
Our Contribution: In this work, we pose the problem of PIR over unsynchronized databases and recognize its connection to distributed source coding. We propose a two-stage architecture to solve the problem; this architecture leads to a collusion-resistant PIR scheme that probabilistically returns the desired record even when the contacted servers' databases are not perfectly synchronized. The key idea of our scheme is simple: we first determine which records are mis-synchronized, and then construct a PIR query that avoids these problematic records. When the number of unsynchronized database records scales sublinearly in the database size 3 , our scheme has asymptotic communication and online computation costs that are identical to state-of-the-art PIR schemes. In practice, we incur slightly higher communication and server-side computation compared to traditional PIR, but we show through simulation that these costs are not prohibitive. Our approach also allows multiple queries to be processed in a single batch of PIR, unlike existing schemes. A condensed version of this work appears in [12] ; this paper is a more comprehensive overview, including additional theoretical results, omitted proofs, and practical algorithm considerations.
II. BACKGROUND
We briefly explain private information retrieval and distributed source coding ideas related to our problem. Boldface lowercase variables denote vectors, and regular non-bolded variables denote scalars. Boldface uppercase variables denote matrices, and uppercase non-bolded, subscripted variables denote matrix elements. For , denotes . Parameter definitions can be found in Table I A. Private Information Retrieval Private information retrieval (PIR) is a technique allowing a client to retrieve the th record from a database of records without revealing the query index to the server. As mentioned earlier, we will focus on multi-server PIR in this paper, because it is significantly more efficient than single-server schemes in practice. Multi-server PIR gives information-theoretic privacy guarantees and assumes that the client has access to non-colluding servers with identical copies of the database. 4 We begin with an example of information-theoretic, multi-server PIR proposed by Chor et al. [7] .
1) Basic PIR Scheme [7] : Two servers store identical copies of a database of records , and a client wishes to Fig. 3 . Two-server PIR scheme [7] . Each server computes the bitwise sum of a client-specified subset of database records. Since the two subsets differ only at the th index, the binary sum of each server's results gives the desired record.
retrieve the th record, . In practice, records can be of arbitrary length, but for simplicity, suppose each database element is a single bit, 0 or 1. The user's request can be represented by , the indicator vector with a 1 at index and 0's elsewhere. To disguise this query, the user generates a random string with each entry a Bernoulli (1/2) random variable. The queries sent to servers 1 and 2 are and , respectively. Each server computes the inner product of its received query vector with the database using bitwise addition (XOR) and returns a single-bit result. The user XORs the results from the two servers to get (see Fig. 3 ). In an honest-but-curious adversarial model, this PIR scheme is information-theoretically private.
2) Collusion Resistance: In multi-server PIR, privacy is lost if servers collude. There exist PIR schemes that offer -collusion-resistance-if no more than of the servers collude, information-theoretic security is guaranteed [2] , [14] , [35] . We will explain a simplified version of [14] , which is closely related to ideas from the area of multiparty computation [4] , [33] . We later adapt this scheme to handle unsynchronized databases as well as concurrent queries.
The basic idea of collusion-resistant PIR in [14] is as follows: The client designs a random polynomial of degree , such that (the desired record). The client instructs each server to evaluate at a distinct . The client then interpolates these evaluations to recover . Since points are required to interpolate a -degree polynomial, up to servers can collude without compromising privacy.
More detailed explanation:
In the two-server case, the client transmitted and to servers 1 and 2, respectively. These queries can be interpreted as two characteristic points from a linear, vector-valued polynomial . Namely, when , we get , and . We use (or ) to denote a server's reply to the PIR query (or , respectively). The client's goal is to determine , the output for the query . It is straightforward to show that is a linear function of and , so we need only two distinct input queries to interpolate the value of . In the two-server example, is interpolated by taking . This two-server query is not immune to server collusion. Now suppose we wish to resist collusion between any set of at most servers in the system-for concreteness, let . We can achieve this by querying servers; for our concrete example, let . Instead of the linear query from the two-server case, we now submit query vectors that are quadratic in , i.e. of degree . Note that this scheme requires a finite field containing at least elements. So our example polynomial query is , where are elementwise randomly-drawn vectors, and is a vector of zeros with a one at index . So if the database has two elements, this is equivalent to drawing independent, univariate, -degree polynomials; all the polynomials have a zero constant term except for the polynomial corresponding to the desired record index . Concretely, suppose we want record . Then we draw two random quadratic polynomials (one per database record).
(1) where denote the th elements of vectors , respectively. The client evaluates these polynomials (one for each database element) at distinct values of (one for each server), and compounds the results into query vectors. For instance, the client might send to server 1, to server 2, and to server 3. Since the queries are quadratic in , at least three servers must collude to learn the desired record. Upon receiving such a query, each server projects the database onto the query, and returns a single value as a result:
Observe that is quadratic in , and . The client therefore needs three distinct function points to interpolate , or points in general. 5 We write which is equivalent to . The interpolated can be computed using the bottom row of in the above expression ( is full-rank). In our example, we get . This approach can be extended to accommodate arbitrary collusion-resistance parameters (Algorithm 3, Appendix B).
B. Distributed Source Coding
Our approach to PIR relies on distributed source coding, in which multiple, non-communicating sources attempt to efficiently communicate correlated information to a receiver. In our problem, the client is the receiver, and the servers are the distributed sources. We assume the number of unsynchronized database elements is small, so the servers' contents are highly correlated. The client wishes to learn which database elements are unsynchronized-i.e., the difference of the servers' data-to successfully complete PIR. Concretely, suppose servers-say -store databases and that are differentially sparse, i.e. the vector is comprised mostly 5 In this example, we could actually decode with only two repliesis linear in
and . This special case arises because the database size . of zeros. 6 The goal is for the client to learn which records are unsynchronized with minimal computation and communication; this is equivalent to learning the support of the sparse vector . This problem has been studied for by Korner and Marton [18] .
Initially, we ignore the distributed servers and instead suppose a genie has access to . The genie must minimize the communication and computation to communicate to the client. This is equivalent to finite-field compressed sensing. We will show two approaches for solving the problem with a genie, after which we will explain how a client can learn the support of , which encodes the mis-synchronized database indices, from distributed, non-colluding servers at nearly the same cost as that incurred by the genie.
1) Genie-Dependent Solutions:
contains elements, and at most of them are nonzero, . The genie can send linear combinations of the entries of , called parity symbols (or measurements in compressed sensing literature) to the client for decoding. These parity symbols are generated by left-multiplying the sparse vector by a parity check matrix (or sensing matrix in compressed sensing), giving a measurement vector , as illustrated in Fig. 4 . If is well-designed, can be reconstructed from few parity symbols; plays a compressive role, reducing genie-to-client communication.
MDS codes: One approach for reconstructing the desired vector uses maximum distance separable (MDS) codes, such as Reed-Solomon (RS) codes. An MDS code with message size and block length can correct the theoretical maximum of errors [31] . So if a received codeword is corrupted with errors (the wrong symbol is received), then as long as , an MDS code can recover the initial message. Additionally, in a systematic MDS code, the first symbols of the codeword are exactly the message symbols. The remaining symbols are known are parity symbols, which are linear combinations of the message symbols.
To use MDS codes for our problem, we exploit the sparsity of . Encoding with a systematic RS code that corrects at most errors, the resulting codeword would be , where the 's denote parity symbols. The receiver measures only the parity symbols (it assumes the first systematic symbols are all zeros due to our sparsity assumption). Then the recorded codeword would contain exactly errors, all in the systematic symbols; the decoder could correct them all and deterministically recover the nonzero entries of . This scheme has low communication cost, but the decoding complexity can be prohibitive in practice-particularly if the number of unsynchronized records is large. For instance, 6 Our notation here is similar to that previously used for server response polynomials,
. This is because we will soon consider vector-valued server response polynomials that are sparse when evaluated at . . maps elements of to bins. Singleton bins map to a single nonzero element, while multitons map to multiple nonzero elements. On finding a singleton, the decoder strips it from all bins. For example, by stripping element 1 of from bins 3 and 5, bin 5 becomes a singleton. After row-tensoring , each bin has two additional entries (not pictured) that help the decoder decide if a bin is a singleton.
Berlekamp-Massey decoding for RS codes has asymptotic complexity for a codeword of block length [16] . Faster algorithms exist, but are still superlinear in .
A probabilistic approach: A different scheme called PULSE is well-suited to reconstructing when the number of nonzero entries is large [26] . Intuitively, the encoder maps linear combinations of the sparse vector entries into a small number of bins; the decoder is able to recover the original entries by iteratively peeling nonzero entries from the bins, thereby efficiently solving a linear system of equations. The parity check matrix in this scheme is constructed as , where denotes a row-tensor product, and is the first three rows of an Vandermonde matrix. is a binary low-density parity-check (LDPC) matrix, designed using a left-regular LDPC construction for simplicity (an optimal irregular construction can also be used [19] ). A left-regular construction means that each column in the LDPC matrix has the same number of nonzero entries.
The LDPC matrix can be thought of as a bipartite graph between the elements of the sparse vector and the measured bins (Fig. 5) . If a bin in maps to exactly one nonzero element of , then we call that bin a singleton; if more than one nonzero element maps to a bin in , that element is a multiton. Otherwise, the bin is a zeroton.
Matrix helps the decoder learn which bins are singletons. The singleton detection algorithm is detailed in Appendix B, Algorithm 4. Intuitively, after finding a singleton, the decoding algorithm subtracts the corresponding nonzero element of from all elements of to which it maps. The components of this scheme are well-studied, but this particular scheme over finite fields has not been explicitly described in the literature. For completeness, we include the following result:
Theorem 1: (From [26] ) Suppose the compressed sensing algorithm above uses a degree-3, left-regular LDPC construction, with measurements. If the signal sparsity scales according to , where , the peeling decoder asymptotically recovers the vector support with probability at least in operations. The proof can be found in [26] . The sparsity constraint is not restrictive because our PIR scheme is only practical for small numbers of mis-synchronizations; nonetheless, PULSE can handle essentially any sublinear sparsity scaling if . These results are asymptotic, but in practice, PULSE performs well even on small databases.
2) Distributed Solution: So far, we assumed the genie has access to sparse vector . However, servers' databases are only assumed to be differentially sparse, i.e. their difference is sparse, and those servers cannot communicate with each other. A result Fig. 6 . PIR when the databases are unsynchronized; server 2 has an out-of-date record, . Traditional PIR methods fail in this scenario. In this example, the desired record was , but the client received the summation of and an error term, .
by Korner and Marton [18] states that to learn the differential of the two databases over a binary field with minimum communication, each server should encode its local view of the database using a random linear code with rate , where denotes the binary entropy function. We cannot utilize the same solution because of decoding complexity and our need for collusion-resistance (requiring non-binary fields). However, our approach uses a similar intuition, much like [29] . Each server individually encodes its database with the described linear codes. We make no claims of optimality, but we will show later that the overhead is small. This approach is conceptually similar to Biff codes for set reconciliation [22] ; however, we consider the different problem of sequence reconciliation.
Nonetheless, we can use the Korner-Marton result to lowerbound communication costs. For instance, if approximately 11 percent of the database is unsynchronized and each record is one bit, each server must send at least bits; between two servers, the client is receiving an entire database's worth of communication. This observation-and more generally, the concavity of the binary entropy function in the Korner-Marton result-supports our assertion that the number of unsynchronized records must be kept small.
III. PIR OVER UNSYNCHRONIZED DATABASES
Existing PIR methods are provably correct when the servers store identical copies of the database. However, individual server nodes may store unsynchronized versions of a database. This will cause traditional PIR algorithms to fail with high probability. For example, consider the two-server PIR scheme in Section II-A-1 when one server has an out-of-date entry. When the client decodes the replies from the servers, she gets the sum of the desired record with an error term (Fig. 6 ).
There are a few ways to circumvent this issue. One is to treat the reply from the out-of-date server as an error, and query another server. Schemes like [10] , [14] inherently enable this via robustness to Byzantine servers. However, it may be more expensive to query a new server than to communicate more with an already-connected server. It may also be unrealistic to assume that the client will find any set of perfectly-synchronized servers in a reasonable amount of time. We propose a scheme that functions over unsynchronized databases at the expense of increased computation and communication. When the number of unsynchronized records is small, we can treat PIR as a distributed source coding problem. We assume throughout that synchronization errors are i.i.d. and uniformly distributed across the database.
Main Idea: Our proposed scheme is divided into two communication rounds. In Phase 1, we learn which records are unsynchronized; in Phase 2, we conduct PIR knowing the synchronization error locations. We adapt [14] , a collusion-resistant scheme for synchronized databases (Section II-A-2).
A. Phase 1: Locate Unsynchronized Records
In this phase, the objective is to efficiently learn the mis-synchronization locations from distributed servers. The client transmits no information about the desired record index, so privacy is preserved. Suppose the client knows that at most records are unsynchronized. Unlike [12] , we assume that the database stores hashes of each record-if two servers have the same version of record , then they both store the same hash ; otherwise, the hashes are different with high probability [6] . We will show that this lowers our accuracy slightly compared to [12] 
1) Basic Solution:
Suppose we have only two servers, and a genie sums the servers' respective views of the database hashes over , giving . 7 The synchronized (i.e., equal) hashes cancel, giving a sparse vector of length , with nonzero entries at the unsynchronized records. A parity check matrix could be used to compress this sparse vector for transmission to the client:
. By linearity, this is equivalent to . So to communicate the same information in a distributed fashion, each server can simply compress its own database with a pre-determined matrix, and the client can recover the sparse vector from the compressed vectors.
The same idea works for many databases: each server individually compresses its view of the database by returning to the client. The client can then do pairwise reconstruction, finding sets of unsynchronized records between , and . The final answer is the union of these sets. This approach requires the client to compute distinct sparse vector reconstructions.
2) Better Solution: It is possible to offload slightly more computation to the servers, so the client only needs to compute one sparse reconstruction. We use this approach in simulation. Suppose the client generates a scalar query polynomial such that and the set of roots of is disjoint from the set . The client uses this polynomial for all the database records, and sends , to the servers. Upon receiving a query , each server returns to the client the vector -a scaled version of the hashed database. Note that servers are not (yet) compressing the replies.
The client interpolates the length-reply vectors just as in Section II-A-2 to get , so , where is a matrix:
. If the databases were perfectly synchronized, we would have . Lemma 1: Suppose is synchronized across databases (i.e., all of the servers have identical versions of the record). Then . Otherwise, for any , with probability at least , where denotes record size (bits). 7 We use to denote the elementwise hash of vector . Fig. 7 . Identifying unsynchronized records without any compression. is not synchronized across all servers, so the 2nd entry of is nonzero. This figure is computed over integers, but in practice, all operations are over finite field .
Increasing reduces the probability of error geometrically in at the expense of a linear increase in downlink communication, i.e., symbols per server (Proof in Appendix A). So if at most records are unsynchronized across all servers (assume is known), there will be exactly nonzero entries in at the unsynchronized indices (e.g. index 2 in Fig. 7 ) with probability . The client can thus learn which records are unsynchronized. If we choose , the probability of success is lower bounded by . When is sublinear in database size , the probability of success asymptotically approaches 1. The error stems from using hashes of records. If we use entire records as in [12] , decoding succeeds deterministically, but with communication costs that are linear in record size instead of logarithmic.
Reducing communication: In the previous solution, each server sent bits for the client to learn the support of . However, for , will be a sparse vector. We can therefore reduce the downlink communication by using distributed compression. In , nonzeros at the mis-synchronized indices are like errors in a codeword, which require two parity symbols to locate and correct (if the hash length is more than one symbol, this can be adapted for bursty error correction with bursts). Suppose each hash requires one symbol. The elements of can be recovered deterministically with samples using MDS codes, or with high probability by measuring more than samples according to PULSE compressive sensing using left-regular LDPC codes [26] . Although none of the servers knows the sparse vector , each server can individually compress its reply vector, and the client can recover the sparse vector. The client decodes the servers' replies to obtain vector , which is decoded according to Algorithm 4 (Appendix B). Algorithm 1 specifies the procedure for identifying unsynchronized records.
Lemma 2: Suppose matrix in Algorithm 1 is constructed from the parity check matrix of a systematic, MDS error-correcting code. If there are at most unsynchronized records, the locations of unsynchronized records can be recovered with probability greater than , assuming synchronization errors are i.i.d. and uniformly random (Proof in Appendix A).
If there are many mis-synchronizations, Reed-Solomon decoding can be inefficient, so PULSE decoding (or another non-MDS code with fast decoding) may be more appropriate.
Corollary 2: Suppose desired record is synchronized across all contacted servers. Suppose Algorithm 1 is run with sensing matrix chosen according to Section II-B-1 [26] . If the number of unsynchronized records is upper bounded by , then the PIR query asymptotically succeeds with probability at least , where is the number of measured bins, (Proof in Appendix A). Efficiency: Each server can precompute a compressed version of the hashed database using a worst-case estimate of the number of unsynchronized records . Then the client need only send the polynomial evaluation point and (estimated via network measurement) to each server. Upon receiving such a query, the server can extract the first entries from its compressed database, scale them by , and return the result. Using this scheme, a client can learn the unsynchronized record locations in one round of communication, with at most total bits of communication.
B. Phase 2: Retrieve the Desired Record(s)
In the second round of communication, the client retrieves the desired records using a modified version of existing PIR schemes. The client now knows which records are unsynchronized from Phase 1, so it must ensure that the servers avoid touching those records. For example, suppose the client learns that record is unsynchronized. In two-server PIR, both servers' query vectors should be zero at index so neither server touches the unsynchronized record. The same idea holds for more servers; the random query polynomial for the th (unsynchronized) record should have roots at so that none of the servers touches the unsynchronized record. Since the query polynomials have degree , this condition holds only for the zero polynomial. However, the client cannot just set the th query polynomial to zero, as this would leak information. Instead, for each nonzero query polynomial at a mis-synchronized index, we swap it with a zero polynomial found elsewhere in the query. Since query polynomials are drawn i.i.d. uniformly at random, the classical result on exchangeability of i.i.d. random variables holds [8] .
Fact 1. For any set of discrete iid random variables , let denote . Given a permutation mapping to itself, Thus a permuted set of query polynomials has the same marginal probability as an unpermuted set. However, if we just swap zero-polynomials into the unsynchronized indices, the probability of index being desired conditioned on the query vector would be lower wherever a collusion of servers sees all zeros at index . The client therefore adds a random, scalar-valued polynomial with zero constant term to every entry of . So the query vector gets transformed as follows:
where at unsynchronized indices is the zero polynomial. The added polynomial acts like a one-time pad; it ensures that if a coalition of servers tries to break privacy, the unsynchronized index will not contain all zeros, but seemingly random numbers. If the databases were synchronized, there would be no zero-swapping, so this additional randomness would not be needed. The client then sends queries built from ; the th server sends back the usual result, which by linearity is the same as . The server also returns the sum of all database records , which can be precomputed. The client subtracts the noise from the th server's reply, recovering the initially desired reply. Note that need not be a polynomial; the client could instead draw a random constant per server. We used random polynomials purely to simplify the notation.
Suppose a client wishes to retrieve records . Phase 2 is described in Algorithm 2 and illustrated in Fig. 8 . Note that changes between Algorithms 1 and 2, but serves the same purpose: to compress servers' responses. Setting to the identity matrix in either algorithm is sufficient for success. For optimal compression though, the number of rows of in Algorithm 1 should depend on the number of unsynchronized records, whereas in Algorithm 2, needs only rows-the number of desired records. This discrepancy arises because in phase 1, the client does not know the support of the sparse vector being measured (mis-synchronized indices), whereas in phase 2, it does (desired database indices). We can tolerate as many mis-synchronizations in Phase 2 as there are zero polynomials in the vector of random query polynomials. For a field size of this amounts to mis-synchronizations on average. parity check matrix of a systematic, MDS error-correcting code, with probability where is the probability of a random query polynomial being the zero polynomial, and . If at most servers collude, the client's query is information-theoretically private (Proof in Appendix A).
The condition means the client recovered all desired records by masking all unsynchronized database indices with zeros. In practice, if there are too few zero polynomials, the client can artificially introduce zero polynomials (which leaks some information) or construct a new query. Thus, the probability of successfully completing a PIR query is dominated by the ability to locate synchronization errors. If is sublinear in , this probability approaches 1 asymptotically. An analogous result holds for PULSE.
Efficiency: The computational and communication costs of this algorithm are listed in Table II , using both the compression technique derived from [26] and Reed-Solomon codes [31] . We also compare our approach to a state-of-the-art scheme by Devet et al. [10] for processing concurrent queries. The comparison is unfair because [10] is not designed for unsynchronized databases; however, we do not know of any schemes that tackle our problem of interest. Table II suggests that the required amount of communication and computation are nearly identical to state-of-the-art schemes when the number of unsynchronized records is small. The main communication overhead in our scheme compared to [10] is the downlink communication in Phase 1 when locating unsynchronized records ( bits). This overhead is asymptotically dominated by the uplink in Phase 2, so the asymptotic total communication complexity is the same between our scheme and [10] . Nonetheless, for practical database sizes, [10] has lower total communication. If the server precomputes hashes for the synchronization phase, the server's online computation cost is essentially equivalent between the two schemes. The client incurs additional computation to recover the locations of unsynchronized records and to interpolate the desired records.
1) Trading Privacy for Efficiency:
Polynomial-swapping works when the database is large, but in a P2P network, servers may store smaller databases. Therefore, there may not be enough zero polynomials in practice to remove all the unsynchronized records from PIR queries. In this case, we can set polynomials to zero. This leaks information; we show that as long as the number of unsynchronized records grows sublinearly in the database size, the leaked information is asymptotically negligible, even with up to servers colluding. Observation 1. Suppose we build PIR queries that force unsynchronized query polynomials to be the zero polynomial. Suppose the client wishes to retrieve (synchronized) record . Let grow sublinearly in , and suppose the true number of unsynchronized records among a set of databases is distributed uniformly on the integers in interval . Suppose at most servers are colluding. Then (Proof in Appendix A).
This says the likelihood of being desired is nearly constant, whether the colluding servers observe zeros at index or not; so zeroing out unsynchronized records reveals little information to a -coalition. For instance, if , field size is , unsynchronized records, and colluding servers, database indices with nonzero query values are almost 4x as likely to be desired as an index with all zeros. The remaining indices events have equal likelihood.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
To evaluate the practical performance of our scheme, we implemented it under the PERCY++framework [10] , [14] , a C++simulation of multi-server PIR algorithms. 8 Our metrics of interest were 1) probability of success, and 2) total query runtime, measured under realistic system settings. For these simulations, we used the PULSE compression approach, due to its simplicity and speed of decoding. Simulations were run on a virtual machine running on an Intel Core i7-620M processor, with one 2.67 GHz processing core and 1 GB of RAM. Measurements are averaged over 500 runs. Database records are 2048 bytes; all computations are over . We denote our scheme with 'UPIR' (unsynchronized PIR) in all figures and tables; PULSE indicates use of PULSE compression (correspondingly, RS for Reed-Solomon).
A. Unsynchronized Databases 1) Probability of Success: Certain patterns of query records and mis-synchronizations can lead to decoding errors, resulting in the client being not recovering the requested record. The probability of correctly retrieving the desired record increases as a function of communication cost. Fig. 9 plots the probability of success as a function of the number of bins used for compression. Each 'bin' consists of three ratio measurements, each bits. Even when the number of mis-synchronized records is small, this PIR scheme returns the desired record with high probability, as long as the servers use a small constant factor of the optimal number of bins. In this setup, we incur 7.2 kB extra communication to handle 100 mis-synchronized records. This is significant for our test database of 2 kB records. However, as records scale to larger sizes, e.g. a 3 order of magnitude increase, the overhead communication grows an order of magnitude to 72 kB-a fraction of the downlink communication required in Phase 2.
2) Runtime: The bottleneck in our scheme compared to the state-of-the-art [10] is locating unsynchronized records. In simulation, we did not pre-compute the synchronization replies for the servers, so these runtimes are worst-case estimates. Fig. 10 shows runtime as a function of the number of unsynchronized database records. Our scheme runs within an order of magnitude of [10] 's runtime, and can complete a query in under 0.03 seconds in the face of 128 unsynchronized database records. We ran [10] over synchronized databases, since it does not complete successfully when run over unsynchronized databases. Our runtime overhead is comparatively small, but it increases with the number of unsynchronized records. Fig. 11 shows how runtime scales as a function of database size, measured in the number of database records. We fixed the number of unsynchronized records to 32, and used 72 bins to recover mis-synchronized records. This plot suggests that the runtime grows by less than an order of magnitude, even as the database size increases by several orders of magnitude. The overhead of our scheme compared to [10] does not increase as a function of database size, because the runtime overhead is dominated by locating the synchronization errors-a process that depends more heavily on the number of unsynchronized records than the database size. For a fixed number of mis-synchronizations, this overhead as a fraction of the total runtime actually decreases with database size. Thus we conclude that the raw number of unsynchronized records is the main contributing factor to added runtime.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented the first multiserver PIR scheme to function when databases are not synchronized. The proposed scheme does not incur significant additional communication and runtime costs when the number of unsynchronized records is small. When this number is small, the runtime increased by less than an order of magnitude in simulation.
These results suggest that in a networked PIR setting, the average fraction of unsynchronized records should be controlled to limit query times and overhead communication. Servers could update their records regularly to ensure that each server's database differs only slightly compared to the baseline. Designing an optimal database update strategy is of both practical and theoretical interest. Other important issues include designing schemes that tolerate inserted or deleted records, causing the databases to misalign. will be nonzero unless cancels the other terms, which happens with probability , where is the length of the hash in symbols [6] . For collision-resistance, ; the probability of interpolating a false zero is , and the probability of incorrectly interpolating a zero is . Lemma 2: Nonzero entries in can be found w.h.p. Proof: The lemma is true iff a) the number of erroneous coded symbols is and b) the support of is the indices of the unsynchronized files. Per Algorithm 1, the servers return . The client obtains vector by taking
APPENDIX A PROOFS
If the support of is the unsynchronized indices, is at most -sparse. is a parity-check matrix of a linear, systematic, MDS code. At most estimated coded symbols are erroneous, and can always be located using the parity symbols. If the support of is not the unsynchronized indices, Lemma 1 implies that record(s) are unsynchronized, but the corresponding entries of are still zero, which happens with probability . The probability of recovering all unsynced indices is . . His research interests broadly span the area of systems theory and algorithms intersecting the fields of signal processing, coding and information theory, communications and networking, with a current focus on distributed storage systems, sparse signal processing, codes on graphs, collaborative content delivery, privacy, and crowdsourcing.
